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Abstract 
 
Prior research on citizen support for European integration has primarily focused on 
individuals’ evaluations of the process of integration or its institutions, with emphasis on the 
importance of direct benefits and costs integration can confer. Explanations focus on overall 
support for integration and little work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific 
policy areas, such as the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Prior 
work also does not consider individuals’ evaluations of member states in models. This paper will 
fill this gap in the research by formulating and testing a political cohesion model, which can be 
considered complementary to preexisting models. The analysis synthesizes systems theory with 
social identity theory to produce a core claim that the probability of supporting the CFSP 
increases with greater levels of political trust in the European Union member-states. The 
development of political cohesion, as measured by the amount of trust in member-states, is 
assumed to be reflective of a positive perception. Positive perceptions of member-states are 
critical because integration’s development is influenced strongly by and dependent upon the 
resources of the relatively more powerful European member-states. Therefore, positive 
perceptions of the top EU powers, namely Germany and France, improve the probability of 
supporting a CFSP, more so than trusting the remaining members. The results hold even when 
controlling for demographic variables, political values, ideology, and the democratic deficit. 
Binary logistic regression analysis using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the 
Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1992 through 1997 among individuals of 11 member-states 
largely support these claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference Austin, Texas, March 31-
April 2, 2005.   1
Introduction: Political community, European unification, and a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy 
Early thoughts regarding European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by 
establishing a community of Europeans. However, research has since demonstrated that this goal 
is more pragmatic than idealistic in facilitating positive-sum transactions. A political community 
can only develop, within a democratic context, if it has support from those that comprise it 
(Easton 1965). Therefore, without a support for a political community, it may be difficult to see 
any significant degree of support for other components of the political system (Easton 1965:  
189).  
Haas stated that a political community is in place when “specific groups and individuals 
show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a 
specific period of time and in a definable geographic space” (1958:  5). Etzioni adds that a 
political community “has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the 
allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community…and it is the dominant focus of 
political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens” (1965:  4). Both of 
these definitions rest on the need to identify a central node of decision-making. The problem 
with their definitions occurs when no single central node of decision-making is present. What if 
decision-making is decentralized? If we relax the notion of centralism, a political community 
refers to the cohesion among individuals and the decision-makers. Given the EU decision-
making structure, these decision-makers are primarily national and are found in the European 
power hierarchy. Overall, this is what Easton refers to as a political community:  “that aspect of a 
political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a   2
political division of labor” (1965:  177). This emphasizes that individuals are drawn together for 
the purpose of operating in a common structure.  
The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community 
building both in its horizontal and vertical dimensions. Jean Monnet and his cohorts in the pan-
European movement held a vision that is reflected in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome:   
integration is a project for the establishment of a common people with a common government. 
Political cohesion would therefore be a source of support for policies that lead to European 
integration such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In a fully integrated 
system, a decision-making hierarchy refers to the power center(s) developed by a constitution. 
For example, the British hierarchy has the cabinet and prime minister holding the top position in 
policy making, with the other institutions holding subordinate positions. In the case of the EU, 
decision-making is primarily in the hands of the member-countries themselves (Moravcsik 1991 
& 1993). They, through the IGCs and the European Council, determine the amount of 
sovereignty given to EU institutions as well as the direction of integration. Therefore the 
European power hierarchy refers to the pattern of power distribution among the member-states. 
Decision-making will generally focus on the preferences of the more powerful (i.e., larger and 
wealthier) member-states.  
The central argument is that individuals’ support for the CFSP depends upon the formation 
of a European political community whose foundation rests on the political trust given to the more 
powerful member-states, namely Germany and France. Trust develops from the positive 
perceptions of member-states because such perceptions broaden in-group membership. The 
remaining sections will go into further detail the importance of in-group membership and its 
connection with support for the CFSP, as well as the data description and hypotheses testing.    3
Self-interest, trust, and cooperation 
Addressing the question of why individuals would support the potential CFSP requires an 
assessment of work on overall support for European integration. Easton’s (1965; 1975) 
theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) 
or diffuse. This section differentiates the motivations of both types and concludes that given 
differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may not be as powerful in 
explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support are primarily self-
interest in nature while diffuse (what I refer to as loyalty) stems from a common interest 
motivation. Utilitarian support results from an exchange where outputs (which can be economic 
or non-economic gains for the individual) are provided by the state in order to maintain the 
system through citizen support (Easton 1965:  157). Utilitarian support is especially popular 
among researchers in the context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization 
of self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 
1965).
1 Researchers point to the fact that motivations for utilitarian support arise from 
evaluations of the EU providing rewards that minimize any negative effects, including the 
changing role of the EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and 
Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a tie between support levels in the four core countries of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of 
                                                 
1The utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, which approaches 
the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to other works that explain the behavior 
of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and their impact on national government decision (Downs 
1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation 
of the political elite is either to remain in power or to allow a particular political party to remain in power. 
Therefore the politician will form coalitions among societal groups for this end. The wishes of the domestic forces 
need to be satisfied before the next turn in the political cycle occurs. Endogenous economic theory applies this 
logic to nation-state policy formulation regarding the global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on 
their role in the economy (Stopler and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), 
economic sectors (Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make 
their economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.  
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integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively 
notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. 
Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various 
levels of influence on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method 
of analysis with similar results (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). 
Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach by examining an individual’s socio-
economic position and predict the probability of their support given an individual’s position in 
the economy and the theoretical outcomes of the effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; 
Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998). 
Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary 
economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic 
wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 
1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early 
years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing 
memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in 
supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form 
of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and 
high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).  
These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow 
range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other 
factors that lead to self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but may not be 
able to explain the support that will produce stability in the system in the long term. These 
models assume that individuals make no other calculations and beg the question if this alone is   5
enough to explain support. While significant in their contribution, it tells us only part of the story 
behind citizen support. The other half of the story begins by understanding affective support. 
Affective support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to 
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging 
to their wants” (Easton 1965:  273; 1975:  444). Affective support should not be equated with 
specific support because outputs themselves are not the focus of attention; it is the political 
object itself. Therefore affective support “is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it 
constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not 
easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (1965:  274). What “an attachment” refers 
to is not quite clear. He does mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965:  325) 
but this concept also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” 
(1965:  184). In the simplest formulation, affective support occurs after a period of time when 
specific support is present (Easton 1965).
2 Affective support enters the picture when the political 
system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965:  333). 
However, common interest is not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a 
collection of individuals to have similar interests; however the summation of these interests does 
not necessarily define a common interest. Common interests arise from a coordination of similar 
self-interests. This coordination is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured 
by trust in the member-states. Common interest develops because there is a “sense of 
community” where individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965:  326). 
To overcome collective action problems, a political community would need to develop 
along common interest motivations. These motivations stem from a common identification, 
                                                 
2 See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war Germany. 
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because without this identity formation all that can be predicted is short-term cooperation instead 
of community building (Deutsch 1957; Russet 1963; Lasswell 1972). Short-term cooperation or 
coalitions have relatively low levels of cohesion and tend, over time, to become unstable 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Gamson 1964). Since European integration is not an effort in short-
term cooperation, its durability would lie in political community building. This community 
building relies on common interest motivations, which are dependent upon social identities. One 
will tend to develop common interests when one can conclude that one has a common fate with 
others. As Wendt argues, “identification is a continuum from the negative to the positive – from 
conceiving it as an anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self” (1994:  386). 
If Europeans develop a positive identification through the process of integration, then this will be 
associated with cohesiveness among those within a broad European political community. If this 
holds, it is possible to detect common interest motivations in addition to self-interest motivations 
for the citizenry’s support for European integration. 
Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common 
interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist 
argument. Inglehart’s (1971; 1977a; 1977b) explanation is that Europeans were socialized in an 
environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era 
developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the 
prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational 
institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel 
(1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the 
relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that 
does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the   7
problem here is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to 
explain. Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain utilitarian support. 
However, the postmaterialist argument is not suited for such an explanation. Postmaterialism 
cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it 
may be possible for both value extremes to favor regional integration policy but for different 
reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that regional 
integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists 
would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean 
air, water, etc.). Explaining support for integration policy would benefit from a model that taps 
into the notion of common interests; in other words a model that understands individuals’ 
evaluations of the political community the European elite is trying to build. This requires a 
model whose primary concern is not what Europe can do for individuals, but what idea of 
Europe is in the perceptions of individuals.  
A political cohesion model for supporting the CFSP 
Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration 
has mainly focused on the role of factors that would impede the formation of the political 
community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule 
because it adds legitimacy to the governors by the governed. They are also differentiated from 
prior work in that they do not focus on the non-EU level explanations for support. McLaren 
(2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures determines attitudes towards the 
European Union. Carey (2002) also demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the 
probability that an individual will support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen 
(2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming primary   8
national allegiances. Their claim is that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European 
identity and thereby lowers the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion 
model for supporting the CFSP, I shift attention away from individuals’ direct evaluations of the 
EU and towards the evaluations of member-states. The political cohesion model looks at the 
development of a political community and thereby focuses on common interests. In producing 
this model, I will also emphasize that common interest and self-interest are not mutually 
exclusive. By being part of a political community, an individual recognizes that one’s self-
interest and the common interest are interdependent.  
The idea of integration and its support may require that individuals think of the project as a 
group effort and one based on long-term gains. The longer time horizon therefore requires 
individuals to support the idea of a CFSP because it is a collective good requiring collective 
action. I link support for integration to individuals’ perception that the project is a group effort. 
This perception can have a positive effect on support and tied to the usual collective action 
problems. Support improves with the higher the level of cohesion. Greater cohesion lowers the 
barriers to collective action to solve the problems facing Europeans, such as issues dealing with 
security and foreign affairs.  
Political cohesion is closely associated with establishment of a common identity. Through 
a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective 
problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. A 
common identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic affiliation 
(Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any characteristic that 
we usually use for national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 1996; McKay 1996). 
However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is “imagined” and develops   9
through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of “imagined” speaks to the 
malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or adaptation to new political and/or 
economic realities rather than from biological or common blood rationalities. In its construction, 
individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong to a specific identity. In fact, 
individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the characteristics of those who 
already claim the identity. This concept of in-group/out-group identity (who is and is not a 
member of group) will be shown as being important in the social-psychological dynamics within 
and among such groups in a political community.  
The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in 
liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified 
in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, many EU citizens may not have this 
level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed (Anderson 
1998). The more reasonable approach in explaining identity and its implication on EU policy 
support is through the psychology of common interest evaluations.  
Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. 
These attachments promote cohesion among group members that are associated with the social-
psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. One reason why an individual 
becomes a group member (the in-group) is due to an affective attachment (Terhune 1964; Winter 
1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). An individual forms an emotional 
attachment because the group fulfills some symbolic value. At the level of national identity, 
individuals attach themselves because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is 
important (DeLamater et al. 1969). Also individuals will interact with individuals who are 
members of another group if this group’s members share some commonality with in-group   10
members (Brewer 1968). The members of both groups are more trusting of each other and 
thereby facilitating of cooperation among members. One often cited definition of trust is “the 
probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about” 
(Gamson 1968:  54). That is, group members will not need to monitor each other because there is 
confidence that interests are aligned. Putnam (1993) shows that the level of trust one has for 
others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining 
cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not 
cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995:  46), trust yields a stream of future returns on 
exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and 
stable. Therefore, groups may overlap to a certain extent to function not only as separate units 
but also, as an integrated unit when perceived similarities are present. When similarities are not 
present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive. The 
importance of similarities in building cohesion lies in understanding in-group biases.  
In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-
group versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early 
psychological experiments individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members 
of their group because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only 
recently informed that they belong to a particular group and had never met or interacted with other 
in-group members (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Kramer 
1985; Messick and Mackie 1989). The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is 
due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. They join and are 
identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By 
associating with similar-valued individuals, self- esteem improves because values are reinforced.   11
This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-
group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also 
subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social 
identity to the importance of the in-group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival 
becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group 
members.  
Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is 
important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the 
context of Europea because the formation of a supranational identity is not theorized to replace 
national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of 
image becomes important. Kelman states that image  
…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive 
system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it 
refers – the individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an 
inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object 
is phenomenally experienced. (1965:  24) 
 
Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the 
totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” 
(1965:  72). In addition such an image is the “property of the individual who beholds the object” 
(Kelman 1965:  27) meaning that the image is not objective and may therefore be dependent on 
various factors. Individuals can therefore use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes 
for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; 
Druckman 1994). Image therefore implies that multiple identities form as members of in-groups 
view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this 
mechanism, tie themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals   12
do with one another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in 
part, because of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is 
present in other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior 
identities. The individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now 
operate with similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups.  
In the context of European identity, an individual may adopt the broader identity when s/he 
has a positive image of other member-states. This perception may result from evaluations of 
similar preferences on a number of issues leading individuals to view member-states as more in 
line with the in-group versus an exclusive out-group identity. However, each member-state does 
not have an equal weight in the decision-making process. Also the member-states have different 
capabilities when it comes to making a CFSP a credible reality. Therefore a positive perception of 
the more powerful states is of greater importance.  
The structure of the European system of states, like the global or other regional systems, is a 
function of power relations. This structure determines the outcomes through the opportunities it 
offers to, and the constraints it puts on, the leadership of each country (Lenin 1939; Waltz 1979; 
Organski & Kugler 1980; Keohane 1984; Keohane & Milner 1996). The organization of the 
international system is a hierarchy where the preponderant actor rests on top of pyramid-like 
structure, with weaker powers grouped beneath it, depending on their individual relative strengths 
(Krasner 1976; Keohane 1980; Organski & Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981). The same description 
applies to the organization of regions around the globe (Lemke 1996; Tammen et al. 2000). 
However, as stated by Wendt (1992), the structure is important only due to the resulting influence 
it has on the actors involved. He hypothesizes that countries go through a process of socialization 
due their interactions within the structure. They are transformed “…by the institution of   13
sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic 
identities into collective identities” (Wendt 1992:  395).
3 A regional system is an environment 
were countries learn about their position relative to others and from this conclude what 
opportunities there are for cooperation as well as conflict. Relative wealth, population, and 
capabilities (among others) determine which country’s preferences will be enacted and which ones 
will be held in check. The more powerful (the largest and wealthiest) will tend to have their wishes 
debated and implemented.  
Functional outcomes of relations among countries, such as trade patterns, fall under the 
influence of this dynamic. In the EU context, each step in integrating the decision-making systems 
of member-countries is mainly due to the preferences of the more powerful members (Moravcsik 
1991 & 1993). Since the project is one of voluntary cooperation, countries can and do opt-out of 
further integration if their preferences are not inline with the more powerful members. The 
propensity to integrate comes under certain structural conditions:  a regional system must include 
both a set of asymmetrical power relationships and an associated satisfaction with how to develop 
integration (Efird and Genna 2002). The regional leader of the hierarchy strongly influences the 
institutional construction jointly through its preferences and its ability to foster stability (Krasner 
1976; Keohane and Nye 1977).  
In the quest for the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Germany 
played this role by first promoting and then requiring inflationary stability for the establishment of 
the euro (McNamra 1998). The establishment of the “inclusion criteria” (low inflation, fiscal 
deficits, and public debt) and European Central Bank autonomy were requirements insisted upon 
by Germany. Germany benefited in establishing the EMU due to its large share of total intra-EU 
                                                 
3 See also Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990). 
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trade (De Grauwe 1997). By changing the nature of monetary sovereignty along with the other 
eleven EMU members, Germany would garner the returns due to a common currency (Molle 
1997), while still pursuing the monetary policy that it prefers.   
The relevance of understanding the structure’s influence on integration, in this research, is 
due to its relationship with supporting the CFSP. More precisely, individuals’ images of EU 
member-states may influence the amount of trust they will have in them. Geva and Hanson (1999) 
have shown in experimental work that individuals’ reactions to events by countries do modify how 
they think of them. While their work focuses on crisis points, one can comfortably assume that 
influences on country perceptions can also occur over a long set of iterated events such as those 
found in the process of integration. Given the nature of a CFSP, the committed role of the more 
powerful countries in Europeans’ perceptions would need to be credible. Defection from an 
established CFSP by Belgium would be quantitatively and qualitatively difference than a defection 
by Germany. In fact, one can reason that a Belgian defection would be a disappointment while a 
German defection would be catastrophe. Therefore trust in the member-states would be divided 
along a latent variable that measures the member-states status within the Union. The more 
powerful countries would occupy one dimension (Germany and France), the small but wealthy 
countries in another dimension (Denmark and the Benelux countries), and the rest in a third 
dimension. In sum, trust in the more powerful member-states will have a greater influence in 
predicting the probability of an individual supporting a CFSP than trust in the other members. 
Data description and testing procedures 
The public opinion data come from multiple Eurobarometer surveys (1992-1997). These 
surveys were selected because they all included the key independent variables, political trust in 
member-states. The survey responses fall under the category of a repeated cross-sectional data.   15
Time series techniques would therefore be inappropriate (Beck and Katz 1995). As with most 
studies using secondary data, great efforts were taken to optimize the operationalization of the 
variables by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt and Nathan (1985). Given data 
constraints, the analysis includes only samples from eleven members of the EU, which include 
the first twelve members except Luxemburg. Some of the samples were collapsed while others 
were not included:  The Northern Ireland sample was collapsed into the British sample and the 
East German sample was omitted given its unique attributes.
4 I used a weighted variable (the 
nation weight) so that no sub-national group will be over or under representation and results can 
be interpreted with attention to variations within country samples.
5  
OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variables are 
dichotomous. Applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to 
type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ binary logit regression models 
(Long 1997). The evaluations of the coefficients will be based on their significance, direction of 
signs, and their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variables.  
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are individual support for a common defense and common foreign 
policies. A question frequently asked in the Eurobarometer surveys is whether a type of policy 
would be best handled at the national level or the European level of decision-making: 
                                                 
4 The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its 
recent membership, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of questionnaire responses due to 
the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism. 
 
5 The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation 
of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), recent research shows that the error associated with 
individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data 
would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower 
number of observations.  
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Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the 
(NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly 
within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you 
think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be 
decided jointly within the European Community.  
1.  Should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government 
2.  Should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union] 
Security and defense and Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community 
[Union] were two policy areas presented to respondents. Responses were recoded so “national 
level decision-making” has a value of zero and “EC/U level decision-making” has a value of one. 
The logit models can then be interpreted as the probability of an individual favoring such polices 
decided at the EU level.  
Independent variables 
The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondents’ trust 
in other member-states. The question asked the respondent the following:
6 
Which, if any, European Community [Union] country or countries do you think can be 
more trusted politically than others?  
0.  Not mentioned  1.  Mentioned 
The respondents go through the list of member-states and indicate which members are more trust 
than others, including their own.
7 The data was recoded so that all responses indicating trust in 
the respondents’ own country are considered missing because the independent variable is to 
measure trust in member-states other than the respondents’ own state.  
                                                 
6  While this question does not directly ask if the member-states can be trusted in the context of the EU or 
integration, the years in which they were asked (1992 – 1997) were years of the deepening of integration 
(implementation of the Single European Act and the Maastricht debate). The public discourse in these years 
would therefore reflect the saliency of the EU.  
 
7 So as to include consistency for the 1992-1997 analysis, only trust in the first twelve members of the EU are 
included.  
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This question was not posed to all national samples in all years. Table one indicates which 
countries populations were sampled by year. There is a larger frequency of respondents coming 
from France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain. The Danes, Irish, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, 
and Greeks were polled only once either in 1994 or 1995. Only the Italians were polled 
consistently from 1992-1997. Since the Luxemburg respondents were not polled at all, this 
leaves a total of eleven national samples. This pattern of sampling is not statistical problem for 
two reasons. First, since the nation weight is employed in the analysis, the results explain within 
country variances. Therefore no biases are introduced. Second, since country dummy variables 
are also employed (see the following section), the analysis will control for country effects.  
Control variables 
The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the 
light of some prevailing hypotheses.  
Education. To measure this variable, I use a standard question found in all Eurobarometer 
surveys:  How old were you when you stopped full-time education? The responses are then 
collapsed into 9 groups:  values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 21, 
with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Individuals who are still 
studying are coded missing. This may introduce error into the measurement because the 
hypothesized link with the dependent variable is in regard to the amount of education and not 
when the individual finished formal schooling. Anyone who is still studying may have already 
been in school for some time and have reached a hypothetical threshold of having had enough 
education to influence support for the CFSP. Unfortunately they will not be included because it 
is unknown where they are in their education.    18
Democratic Deficit. This variable attempts to capture the degree to which individuals are 
satisfied with democracy at the EU level.  This question was asked in 1992-1994 and then again 
in 1997: 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Community [Union]?   
1.   Very satisfied    2.  Fairly satisfied 
3.  Not very satisfied  4.  Not at all satisfied. 
The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics (McCormick 1999; 
Schmitter 2000). The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the large public protests outside 
EU Council and Intergovernmental Conference meetings. Rohrschneider’s (2002) analysis 
indicates that there is a positive relationship between being satisfied with EU level democracy 
and support for integration. Therefore perceptions of EU level democracy may therefore have a 
similar relationship with support for the CSFP. This variable was recoded so that larger values 
represent satisfaction with democracy at the EU level. Since this question was not asked in the 
all years, sample size will considerably vary between models that include and do not include this 
variable.  
Age. This information, measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic 
variables found in the Eurobarometer surveys. The variable was recoded into five categories 
representing specific age cohorts. An alternative argument would be that memories of war would 
influence older Europeans to favor the CFSP, more so than younger Europeans. Prior research on 
support for integration demonstrated that this factor has diminished as the memory of the war 
fades (Gabel 1998). However, it may still prove important in the context of this analysis.  
Income. Respondents were asked to choose from among four categories that approximates 
their annual household income in each survey. An alternative hypothesis is that respondents’ 
with higher incomes are more likely to support for a CFSP.    19
Postmaterialism/Cognitive Mobilization. The questions that measure these two variables 
are normally asked in these surveys. Please see Inglehart (1977b; 1990) for details on 
constructing these two variables. Both are hypothesized to be positively correlated with support 
and identity. However, as previously mentioned in the literature review, research has determined 
that their explanatory values are not as significant as once first thought. Also, the postmaterialist 
variable was only included in the 1992-1994 surveys and the cognitive mobilization variable was 
omitted from the 1994 survey. Therefore models that include these variables will have different 
sample sizes than those that do not include them.  
Ideology. Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on support 
for integration (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this possible effect is 
through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-
right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. An 
alternative hypothesis is that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with 
supporting the CSFP.  
Country and year effects. Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but 
the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects 
that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each 
regression the base country is Belgium and the base year is 1992.  
Explaining support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in 
explaining support for the CFSP. Specifically, trust in the more powerful member-state, 
Germany, improves the likelihood that the respondent would favor a common set of security and 
foreign polices. Figure one illustrates the distribution of trust in the four wealthier members of   20
the EU by national sample. Almost all the national samples selected Germany as the most trusted 
among the four. The only exceptions were the Irish and Portuguese samples, which favored 
France. France was the second most trusted with the exceptions being the Dutch and Danish 
samples, which favored Britain as their second choice. Although not included in the figure, all 
other member-states received small percentages.  
In order to determine if the trust questions measure the hypothesized three latent variables, 
a maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis (varimax rotation) was conducted. Recall 
that the variables were hypothesized to group together along power dimensions. The larger 
powers of Germany and France (and perhaps Britain) were hypothesized to fall into one group, 
the small but wealthy member-states would fall into a second group, and the remainder would be 
in a third grouping. The results presented in table two indicate that trust in these twelve member-
states do indeed fall into the three categories. However the factor loading coefficients for top 
powers do not cluster very well. Therefore reliability coefficients (alphas in table two) were 
calculated to determine if each of the groups can adequately be included in an additive index. 
The alphas for the second and third tier country index are respectable (.71 and .72, respectively), 
but the first tier alpha of .51 is unacceptable (DeVellis 1991). The twelve trust variables are 
therefore reduced down into five separate variables: two indices for the second and third tier 
countries and three separate variables for Germany, France, and Britain. The indices are summed 
together and divided by the number of countries included. By dividing the additive term by the 
appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to between zero and one, thereby 
allowing comparability among the five trust variables.  
Table three presents the first results of the binary logit regression with support for a 
common defense and security policy as the dependent variable. Each of the three models is   21
significant as shown by their respective chi-squares. Model one tests the relationship between 
trust in Germany as well as the second and third tier member-states while controlling for various 
variables.
8 The results indicate that trust in Germany and the second tier member-states are 
statistically significant in predicting support for a common defense and security policy. 
However, the third tier index is not significant. These results are in line with the hypothesis: the 
further down the power hierarchy, the less significant in predicting support. The second column 
of results in table three shows the marginal changes in the predicted probabilities. Each value is 
the change in the probability associated with each independent variable as it moves from its 
minimum to its maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their median 
values. A respondent is about 10 percentage points more likely to support a common defense and 
security policy if s/he perceives Germany as being politically trustworthy than if s/he does not. 
The probability increases is less, about 7 percentage points, if the respondent trusts all four 
second tier member-states. The larger value for the Germany-trust variable compared to the 
second tier variable indicates that individuals’ trust in Germany explains a larger amount of 
change in the likelihood that individuals will support a common defense and security policy.  
Model two in table three substitutes the Germany-trust variable with the France-trust 
variable. Of the three trust variables, only the France-trust and second tier trust variables are 
significant. However, this time the second tier trust variable explains a greater amount of change 
in the dependent variable. Trusting all four of the second tier member-states improves the 
probability of support by .08. However, the France-trust variable only improves the same 
probability by .04.  
                                                 
8 The country and year dummy variables where included in the regression but not listed due to space constrains. 
Also, the postmaterialist, cognitive mobilization, and satisfaction with EU level democracy were also included in 
separate regressions with no effect on the key trust variables.    22
Model three completes the analysis of support for the common defense and security 
variable. This time the Britain-trust variable is substituted. In this model, the Britain-trust and 
third tier trust variables are not significant, leaving only the second tier trust variable to be able 
to predict support. When the average respondent trusts all four second tier member-states, the 
probability that s/he will support a common policy improves by .082, which is similar to the 
probability established in model two. 
In sum, trust in Germany explains the largest amount of change in the likelihood that the 
respondent will support a common defense and security policy. Also, recall that model one 
includes national samples from the eleven member-states expect Germany. Therefore trust in the 
most powerful EU member-state, among the non-German national samples, explains the largest 
change in the likelihood of support. This stands in stark contrast with the results of the non-
French national samples, which did not return a strong association with trusting France. The 
worst performer of the three top European powers was Britain: trusting Britain has no statistical 
significant association with support for a common defense policy and is therefore no different 
than the third tier member-states in this regard.  
Table four presents the results of the binary logit regression with support for a common 
foreign policy as the dependent variable, but with slightly different results. While the Germany-
trust variable is still explains a larger change in the probability for support, trust in the second 
tier member-states loses some of its value. Model four’s results show that only the Germany-
trust variable has statistical significance. Also, trusting in Germany improves the probability to 
support a common foreign policy by about .04. Model five indicates that trusting France 
improves this probability by .022 and trusting all four second tier member-states similarly 
improves the probability by .023. However, both the variables in model five are weakly   23
significant. Model six indicates that trust in Britain is very weakly significant and does not 
change the probability much, relatively speaking. In fact, the second tier trust variable has a 
larger marginal change, .033 vs. .014. As before, trust in Germany predicts the largest change in 
the probability for supporting a CFSP among individuals in the non-German national samples. It 
also has greater significance than the other trust variables.  
Conclusion 
The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting 
the CFSP. Trust in the member-states among individuals is significantly associated with higher 
probabilities of support. However, not all member-states are viewed in the same manner. Three 
distinct groupings exist with each grouping determined by country size and wealth. The smaller 
and less wealthy a country is, the less of an impact it has on influencing support for a CFSP. But 
when it comes to the top powers in Europe (Germany, France, and Britain) clear distinctions are 
made among the respondents. Trust in Germany has more importance among individuals than 
trusting the other larger and wealthier powers, namely France and Britain. Trust in France does 
give us some explanation for support, but values are not as large as those associated with 
Germany. Britain proves to be statistically not significant.  
Two important issues must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these 
issues would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important 
enough to consider. First, given that the earliest surveys used in this analysis are about ten years 
old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between trust and 
support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the 
arguments any less salient today. Year dummy variables were not significantly different from the 
base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data   24
is an important way to determine if the findings of the 1990s hold today. The major assumption 
is that the largest power, Germany, is trusted because its interests are also viewed as being inline 
with the EU’s common interests. There is little that would indicate that this has changed. 
Chancellor Schröder’s foreign policy decisions with regard to international terrorism and the 
Iraqi war reflect attitudes found in EU public opinion. Therefore, given the results of this paper, 
a safe assumption can be made that the relationship between trust in Germany and support still 
holds. However, only data analysis can falsify this claim.  
Second, the EU’s eastward expansion adds complexity to model. The security and foreign 
policies of countries such as Poland are not inline with those of Germany. Decisions on troop 
deployments to Iraq and heated disagreements at EU Council meetings over the Iraqi war are 
evidence of this. If this conflict permeates public opinion, then we may witness greater societal 
opposition to the formation of the CFSP. However if such an opposition would occur, it is still 
inline with the central claim of this paper: German foreign and security polices need to be trusted 
to be aligned with the common interest of Europe for CFSP to achieve popular support. If trust in 
Germany levels decline, the probability of supporting the CSFP will also decline among 
individuals in the national samples. Data analysis would be needed to determine if the 
relationship exists in the eastern expansion national samples.    25
Table 1. National samples for “political trust” variables by year 
 
Country  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
France  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Germany  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Britain  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Spain  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Italy  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Denmark     ●     
Ireland   ●     
Portugal    ●     
Belgium      ●    
Netherlands      ●    
Greece     ●    
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Table 2. Maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis for trust in EU member-states 
(varimax rotation) 
 
Trust in:  Factor loading  Factor loading  Factor loading 
France  .602 .129 .206 
Germany  .476 .136 .031 
Britain  .347 .188 .158 
   
Netherlands .169 .627 .127 
Denmark .086 .597 .140 
Luxembourg .240 .540 .201 
Belgium .254 .485 .221 
  
Portugal .063 .206 .599 
Greece .048 .170 .582 
Spain .267 .137 .559 
Italy .193 .082 .533 
Ireland .096 .333 .377 
χ
2 = 533.83; df = 33; p<.000   
Trust in first tier countries reliability α = .51   
Trust in second tier countries reliability α = .71   
Trust in third tier countries reliability α = .72   
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Table 3. Logit model:  Support for EU defense and security policy on trust in member-states 
 
  Model  1 Probabilities Model  2 Probabilities  Model  3  Probabilities 
Trust  variables          
Trust in Germany  .437*** 
(.044) 
.095  --  -- -- -- 
Trust in France  --  --  .162*** 
(.050) 
.037 --  -- 
Trust  in  Britain  -- -- -- --  -.025 
(.053) 
-.006 
Trust in second tier  .304*** 
(.082) 
.067 .365***   
(.078) 
.080 .402*** 
(.078) 
.082 
Trust in third tier  -.087 
(.143) 
-.021 -.092   
(.136) 
-.022 -.095 
(.130) 
-.021 
Control  variables          
Age .007   
(.013) 
.009 .010 
(.013) 
.012 .004 
(.013) 
.004 
Education .089*** 
(.008) 
.162 .088*** 
(.008) 
.154 .088*** 
(.008) 
.150 
Income .058** 
(.019) 
.041 .081*** 
(.019) 
.057 .034* 
(.018) 
.023 
Left/Right self-placement  -.052*** 
(.010) 
-.111 -.045*** 
(.016) 
-.093 -.027*** 
(.009) 
-.054 
Constant .230 
(.226) 
 .239 
(.226) 
 .385 
(.224) 
 
χ
2  
(degrees of freedom) 
1025.34*** 
(21) 
 1016.97*** 
(21) 
 802.58*** 
(21) 
 
log  likelihood  -8905.95  -8995.30   -8847.17   
N  13,811  13,938   13,584   
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; 
***p≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050   28
Table 4. Logit model:  Support for EU common foreign policy on trust in member-states 
 
  Model 4  Probabilities  Model 5  Probabilities  Model 6  Probabilities 
Trust  variables        
Trust in Germany  .333*** 
(.055) 
.038  -- -- -- -- 
Trust in France  --  --  .186** 
(.062) 
.022 --  -- 
Trust  in  Britain  -- -- -- --  .115* 
(.066) 
.014 
Trust in second tier  .118 
(.096) 
.015 .196* 
(.092) 
.023 .297** 
(.094) 
.033 
Trust in third tier  -.152 
(.164) 
-.020 -.212 
(.154) 
-.028 -.216   
(.156) 
-.029 
Control  variables        
Age -.049*   
(.015) 
-.032 -.028 
(.015) 
-.018 -.010 
(.016) 
-.006 
Education .028*** 
(.009) 
.029 .037*** 
(.009) 
.035 .047*** 
(.009) 
.045 
Income .077*** 
(.022) 
.031 .098*** 
(.022) 
.038 .107*** 
(.023) 
.041 
Left/Right self-placement  -.026* 
(.011) 
-.030 -.023 
(.012) 
-.026 -.012 
(.012) 
-.013 
Constant 1.64*** 
(.293) 
 1.57*** 
(.290) 
 1.36*** 
(.293) 
 
χ
2  
(degrees of freedom) 
519.02*** 
(21) 
 509.08*** 
(21) 
 342.76*** 
(21) 
 
log  likelihood  -6957.65  -7032.91  -6477.84  
N  13,242  13,376  13,066  
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; 
***p≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050   29
Figure 1. Percentage of trust in European powers by country samples 
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